Securities - The Williams Act: A Tender Trap by Hart, G. Lee
SMU Law Review
Volume 24 | Issue 3 Article 12
1970
Securities - The Williams Act: A Tender Trap
G. Lee Hart
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
G. Lee Hart, Securities - The Williams Act: A Tender Trap, 24 Sw L.J. 542 (1970)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol24/iss3/12
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
quences to the defendant." 8 Instead, the court determined that the jurisdic-
tional-amount requirement was satisfied because of the "inescapable depen-
dency" of Mrs. Hatridge's suit upon that of her husband."' This determina-
tion was based primarily on the Arkansas characterization of a consortium
suit as being derivative of the spouse's action. The consortium claim, there-
fore, could not be separated from Mr. Hatridge's much larger claim. Hence,
it was this overall effect on the defendant that met the "matter in contro-
versy" requirement, and brought the consortium claim within the pendent
jurisdiction of a federal court.
In further considering the determination of the issues in Hatridge, it
could be argued that the court's conclusion that the Hatridge's actions in
federal court were dependent and intertwined was in itself erroneous. The
claims of Mr. and Mrs. Hatridge are said by the court to be intertwined,
and hence subject to the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. But it would seem
that because both had already recovered default judgments, the two claims
would no longer be dependent. The receiving of a judgment "establishes an
indisputable obligation."' It would seem that the court failed to note this
distinction between an action to recover on a judgment, and a cause of
action based on the consortium claim where the rights and liabilities of the
parties have not been finally determined.
III. CONCLUSION
The desire for judicial economy and the prevention of forum-shopping
is a beneficial quest. However, it must be determined whether these objec-
tives are important enough to alter significantly accepted requirements for
entrance to the federal courts. It would appear that federal judges are
placed in a confusing position, for they are given the discretionary power
to grant pendent jurisdiction in an effort to promote judicial economy, but
at the same time are required to adhere to strict congressional requirements
for entrance to the federal courts. Using a highly questionable application
of precedent, the court in Hatridge has seemingly betrayed the federal
requisites and left the gates to federal courts unguarded in an apparent
effort to create an economical judicial system.
R. Terry Miller
Securities -The Williams Act: A "Tender Trap"
A director and certain shareholders desired to replace the chief executive
officer of their corporation and to move the corporate offices from Mil-
waukee to New York. To accomplish this they agreed to pool their voting
interests to obtain control of the corporation and force the desired resig-
'8415 F.2d at 816.
9 Id.40 46 Am. JUR. 2D Judgments § 229 (1969).
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nation, or to call a special stockholders' meeting and possibly force a re-
organization of the board. The corporation brought suit to enjoin them
from voting the stock they held, from requesting a stockholders' meeting,
and from acquiring additional shares.! The suit was based on the failure of
the director and the other shareholders to file a schedule under section
13 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 a provision added by the
Williams Act in 1968. Held, preliminary injunction ordered: A "group"
that has undertaken a plan to pool its voting interests of more than ten
per cent of a corporation's securities constitutes a "person" with beneficial
ownership of the pooled stock within the meaning of section 13 (d). Bath
Industries, Inc. v. Blot, 305 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
I. THE WILLIAMS AcT-FIRST LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPT AT REGULATION
OF CASH TENDER OFFERS
In Senate hearings on the Williams Act, the former chairman of the SEC
called the lack of federal regulation in the area of cash tender offers "a
'The Securities and Exchange Commission [hereinafter referred to as the SEC] was not a
party to the suit. Apparently, a suit by the corporation was authorized by Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964). Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot, 305 F. Supp. 526, 535
(E.D. Wis. 1969).
215 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (Supp. IV, 1969), amending 15 U.S.C. 5 78m (1964). [Hereinafter
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 will be referred to as the 1934 Act, and citation will be to
sections of that Act only]. Relevant parts of § 13 (d) are as follows:
(d) (1) Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial
ownership of any equity security of a class which is registered [under the 1934
Act] . . . is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum
of such class shall, within ten days after the acquisition, send to the issuer of the
security . . . . send to each exchange where the security is traded, and file with the
Commission, a statement containing such of the following information . . .
(A) the background and identity of all persons by whom or on whose behalf
the purchases have been or are to be effected;
(B) the source and amount of the funds or other consideration used or to be used
in making the purchases, and if any part of the purchase price is represented or is
to be represented by funds or other consideration borrowed or otherwise obtained
for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or trading such security, a description of the
transaction and the names of the parties thereto, except that where a source of funds
is a loan made in the ordinary course of business by a bank . . . if the person
filing such statement so requests, the name of the bank shall not be made available
to the public;
(C) if the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases is to acquire control
of the business of the issuer of the securities, any plans or proposals which such
persons may have to liquidate such issuer, to sell its assets to or merge it with any
other persons, or to make any other major change in its business or corporate
structure;
(D) the number of shares of such security which are beneficially owned, and
the number of shares concerning which there is a right to acquire, directly or in-
directly, by (i) such person, and (ii) by each associate of such person, giving the
name and address of each such associate; and
(E) information as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings with any
person with respect to any securities of the issuer, including but not limited to
transfer of any of the securities, joint ventures, loan or option agreements, puts
or calls, guaranties of loans, guaranties against loss or guaranties of profits, division
of losses or profits, or the giving or withholding of proxies, naming the persons
with whom such contracts, arrangements, or understandings have been entered into,
and giving the details thereof.
(3) When two or more persons act as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate,
or other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of
an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be deemed a 'person' for the purposes of this
subsection.
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rather large gap in the securities statutes."' To fill this gap the Williams
Act was signed into law July 29, 1968," amending sections 13 and 14 of the
1934 Act. It marked the first entry of the SEC into the direct regulation
of the market for corporate control by means of the cash tender offer.'
According to proponents of the legislation, the "gap" to which Chair-
man Cohen referred was largely one of disclosure requirements applicable
to other securities transactions. The prohibitive language of rule 1ob-5,
for example, often does not impose a duty to disclose in the early, but
important, stages of the cash tender offer." Also, the beneficial owners of
ten per cent of the securities of a corporation who are required to file
statements under section 16 (a)' are not required by that section to provide
the information needed in a cash tender offer situation! What was lacking,
it was argued, was information needed by a shareholder of the "target"
corporation to make an "informed" decision concerning disposition of his
stock."
Stimulated in part by the increasing frequency of "outsiders" obtaining
control of corporations through cash tender offers,"0 differing interests
sought disclosure requirements in tender offer situations. Corporate man-
agement was concerned with the corporate "raider," whose purpose in ob-
taining control was to appropriate the corporate assets for his own benefit.1'
Management was also concerned with the secrecy with which outsiders
could obtain control,"2 which often did not allow management an adequate
opportunity to defend its corporate position." The concern of the SEC, on
the other hand, was with maintaining "public confidence in the integrity of
the securities markets" so that investors could "make an informed and
unalarmed choice as to whether to sell or to hold all or some of their
stock." 4 These "public stockholders," who were being asked in the normal
3 Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].4 Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439.
a Swanson, S. 510 and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers: Distinguishing St. George from
the Dragon, S HARV. J. LEGIS. 431, 433 (1968).
6 See id. at 457.
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 5 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964).
sHearings at 36.
9 Id.
" Hearings at 3. The author of the Act, Senator Williams of New Jersey, in a statement in-
dicating the general purpose of the Act, was concerned solely with the equalization of the in-
terests involved in the tender offer situation: "This bill will put all on an equal footing with
respect to the availability of significant facts about a tender offer or a corporate stock purchase
program. All will be able to deal in the securities markets knowing that all of the pertinent facts
are available. Id. (emphasis added).
itBrudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RuTGERs L. REV. 609, 610-11 (1967).
1 Hearings at 2.
1 Brudney, supra note 11, at 610.
14 Id. at 611. More specifically, Chairman Cohen argued that for the "public shareholder" to
make that "informed" decision concerning a tender offer, he needed information from the offeror
for the following reasons: (1) Because the shareholder was being offered not just cash, "but the
possibility that he may get a certain amount of cash" for all or part of his shares based on un-
known contingencies of the time for, and amount of, shares to be purchased, he needed disclosure
of the exact terms of the offer and "substantive protections" against the contingencies. (2) Price
alone was not enough for a decision. The shareholder needed to know the possible impact of an
offeror's successful purchase upon the control of the corporation. Depending on whether there was
to be a change in control, the shareholder could not correctly evaluate the "control premium."
(This is the difference between the offer price and the current market price of the stock. See
[Vol. 24
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tender offer situation to sell their interest in the target corporation, needed
additional information concerning the identity and background of the
offeror, the arrangements surrounding the financing of the tender offer and
the offeror's present holdings, and the "intent" of the offeror with respect
to the future of the corporation once he obtained control. 5 These and other
arguments for passage of the Williams Act strongly indicated that the
principal purpose of the Act was to regulate the making and acceptance of
cash tender offers."
II. SECTION 13 (d) -ITS SCOPE AND APPLICATION
The two sections of the 1934 Act as amended by the Williams Act are
quite dissimilar. The amendments to section 14-primarily section 14 (d) -
focus on the classic tender offer, where an outsider threatens to obtain
control by making an offer to the shareholders of the target corporation. 7
However, the amendments to section 13 appear to go well beyond this
classic situation.
Section 13 (d) is aimed solely at the owner of stock who has already
acquired "more than 10 per centum" of an issuer's outstanding stock."9 It
applies to beneficial ownership" of any equity security of any class regis-
tered under the 1934 Act acquired either directly or indirectly.' As defined
in section 13 (d) (3), the phrase "any person" may include several differ-
ent parties. That subsection provides that "[wihen two or more persons
act as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or other group for the
purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such
syndicate or group shall be deemed a 'person'. ... " However, the require-
ments of section 13 (d) do not apply where a beneficial owner has acquired
securities at a rate of less than two per cent of the total securities out-
standing within any twelve-month period.2
Swanson, note 5 supra, at 466-67; note 29 infra.) The shareholder thus needed information con-
cerning the offeror's future plans. (3) When a shareholder tenders his shares it is not true that
what happens to the corporation is no longer of any concern to him. This "would be true only
if the person making the offer were to take up all the stock tendered, which is by no means
always the case." The shareholder needed protection by requiring the offeror to take the tendered
shares pro rata if more were tendered than were wanted. Hearings at 205-06. This last "reason"
was specifically met by the Williams Act. See § 14(d) (6).
5 Brudney, supra note 11, at 617. See note 14 supra.
" The record of Senate hearings on the Williams Act-at least with respect to proponents
of the legislation-was concerned almost exclusively with the tender offer situation. See, e.g., the
statements of various witnesses in Hearings at 15, 41, 47, 69 Passim.
17 Section 14(d) applies to "any person" who makes a tender offer and thereafter would be
the beneficial owner of more than 10% of the securities outstanding. The restrictions and dis-
closure requirements closely parallel those of section 13(d). See notes 18-20 infra, and accom-
panying text. Section 14(e) provides a type of lob-5 regulation of fraudulent statements and
omissions of material facts "in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for
tenders." Section 14(f) is concerned with arrangements made, otherwise than at a shareholders'
meeting, in connection with acquiring securities that affect the designation of directors of the
target company.
18 See note 2 supra.
"9 There is nothing in the Williams Act defining "beneficial ownership." But see note 51 infra.
29 See note 2 supra.
1 Id. There is no indication why the term "person," applicable to § 13(d) (I), is defined in
13 (d) (3) in terms of the same word--"two or more persons."
22 Section 13 (d) (5) (B). Conceivably a "beneficial owner" could ultimately acquire in excess
of 10% and not be subject to § 13 (d) as long as he never acquired "directly or indirectly" more
than 2%7 of the total number of shares outstanding within any twelve-month period.
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Once a beneficial owner has acquired securities of the same class in excess
of ten per cent of the total of that class outstanding, section 13 (d) requires
him, within ten days after "such acquisition,"" to send to the issuer of the
security, to any exchange where the security is traded, and to the SEC, a
statement disclosing certain information. 4 The required information in-
cludes: (1) the background and identity of the holder of the ten per cent;
(2) the source and amount of funds used in making the acquisition; (3)
any plans of the holder with respect to the issuer to liquidate, sell the
assets, merge, or "make any other major change in [the issuer's] business
or corporate structure," if the reason for the acquisition in the first place
was to obtain control of the issuer; (4) the number of shares of the issuer
beneficially owned, including those owned "by each associate" of the filer
of the statement; and (5) information concerning any arrangements with
any person concerning any securities of the issuer."
In addition to an exception previously mentioned,8 section 13 (d) recog-
nizes an additional, conceptually-important exception. An acquisition in
excess of ten per cent that the SEC determines not to have been made for
the purpose of "changing or influencing the control of the issuer or other-
wise as not comprehended within the purposes" of section 13 (d) is not
subject to the disclosure requirements. Hence the Williams Act gives the
SEC the power to exempt by rules and regulations that which the framers
of the Act did not intend to be covered.
Critics of the necessity of the legislation were not lacking. Much of the
criticism was concerned with the regulation of tender offers in and of
themselves. 9 Strong arguments were also made against the regulations im-
posed by section 13 (d). Those opposing passage of that section were con-
cerned with the advantages that disclosure requirements would produce for
incumbent corporate management, particularly an entrenched management
that was unresponsive to minority shareholders." This fear was enhanced
by the growing tendency of management to consider itself independent
2 The Act does not indicate the time when "such acquisition" becomes operative, other than
when a holder has acquired in excess of 10% beneficial ownership. Conceivably, this could be a
date difficult to determine with any precision.
2 Section 13 (d) (1) ; see note 2 supra.
25 Section 13(d) (1) (A)-(E); see note 2 supra. The SEC is given authority to require addi-
tional information in the statement as it "may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary and
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." Section 13 (d) (1). The in-
formation now required on schedule 13D exemplifies the SEC's exercise of this authority. 2 CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 23,683 (1969).
2 See note 22 supra, and accompanying text.
27 Section 13 (d) (5) (D).
28 However, only acquisitions made pursuant to pre-emptive rights under certain conditions
have been made exempt. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-4 (1969). Nonetheless, this provision does indicate
an area of discretionary authority for the SEC to distinguish between the owner of securities bent
on obtaining control of a corporation and the owner of securities interested only in a return on
his money. The two other statutory exceptions are "any acquisition or offer to acquire securities
made or proposed to be made by means of a registration statement under the Securities Act of
1933," § 13 (d) (5) (A), and "any acquisition of an equity security by the issuer of such security,"
§ 13(d)(S) (C).
" Some of the arguments for non-regulation of tender offer situations, alone, closely parallel
the arguments specifically opposed to § 13(d)-where 10% ownership has already been acquired.
These parallel arguments are discussed in the text infra. But see note 3 5 infra.
30 Hearings at 13 3.
[Vol. 24
and not accountable to others with interests in the corporation.3 Thus, it
was felt that the "psychology of entrenched management" tended "toward
ineptitude or complacency.""2 Because of management's control over the
proxy machinery, the tender offer was the only effective way to dislodge
inefficient management." This also held true for a strong minority stock-
holder interest of already-acquired stock. The potential threat that these
owners represented to corporate management tended to keep the latter
more efficient."
It was argued that the disclosure requirements of section 13 (d) would
have a further adverse effect on the imbalance of power that already existed
between corporate management and minority interests in situations where
there had been no tender offer.3" "The road of the dissenter is rough enough
anyhow . . . without his being required to telegraph his punches."3 More
specifically, some of the particular items required in the disclosure state-
ment were deprecated. Disclosure of identity was considered superfluous
since this was already required of a ten-per-cent shareholder under section
16(a) of the 1934 Act,"7 and in most situations corporate management
would already be well aware of a shareholder of that size. 8 Disclosure of
the source of funds of one accumulating a ten-per-cent interest was either
irrelevant or presented the possibility of adverse pressure being brought to
bear on the supplier of the funds. 9 Disclosure of future plans by a ten-
per-cent owner was considered meaningless, since no businessman would
be willing to commit himself to a definite, future plan."° Aside from the
further strengthening of the position of management, it was argued that,
assuming the ten-per-cent owner desired control of a corporation, the
information required in the disclosure statement was not the kind of infor-
mation needed by the "other" shareholders to make that "informed" de-
cision.4' Rather, the decision was thought to depend on the likelihood of
the success of the bid for control, whether by tender offer, proxy fight, or
otherwise."
Although section 13 (d) was enacted against a background of concern





'd. at 129-31; cf. Brudney, supra note 11, at 610-11.
a Hearings at 65.
315 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964).
38 Hearings at 65-66.
39 d. at 129.
41 Id. at 129-30. This problem is pointed out by a recent ruling of the SEC in Susquehanna
Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 77,741 (1969). Susquehanna had made a cash tender offer and
had filed a somewhat ambiguous statement of its future plans for the target corporation. Prior to
the filing, the president of Susquehanna had made some oral statements to various individuals in-
dicating that the assets of the target corporation might be disposed of. Even though the board of
Susquehanna had adopted no definite plan, much less a formal proposal, concerning the use of the
target corporation's assets, the SEC determined that the information contained in Susquehanna's
filed statement was false and misleading for failure to reveal that a major change in the business
was intended.
41 See note 14 supra.
'Brudney, supra note 11, at 617.
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in other situations the same disclosure requirements as those demanded of
an outsider making a cash tender offer."' Section 13 (d) left unanswered
the various kinds of situations or transactions which might be subject to its
requirements." Specifically, because the Act defnes "person" to include a
"group" that acquires, holds, or disposes of securities, much importance
attaches to the determination of what constitutes a "group."
III. BATH INDUSTRIES, INC. V. BLOT
In Bath the court dealt with several, previously-unanswered questions
raised by the Williams Act. The sole plaintiff, Bath Industries, Inc., was
a holding company." Named as defendants were several individuals and
corporations. Blot was a director and substantial shareholder of Bath. The
other defendants were Bath shareholders or holders of options to purchase
stock." During the trial, a sheet of paper was introduced as an exhibit
containing a list of Bath shareholders, prepared in Blot's handwriting. The
listed shareholders were supposedly sympathetic to the desires of the named
defendants. Led by Blot, the individual and corporate defendants, as well
as the listed shareholders, undertook what the court termed a "deliberate,
conscious plan"" to pool their voting interests in Bath with the objective
of obtaining control in order to force the resignation of the chief executive
officer and move the corporate offices. Their motives and reasons for such an
objective were not clearly revealed in the opinion. Alternatively, they hoped
to cause the board of directors to discharge the chief executive officer and
replace him with one of their own choosing. If this failed, they intended
to obtain control of the board through a special stockholders' meeting,
presumably preceded by a proxy battle."8
4 3 See S 14(d).
"At the Senate hearings on the Williams legislation, one advocate for passage of the Act
may have unwittingly indicated a possible consequence of this initial regulation of the tender offer
market:
Putting the spotlight of disclosure on covert purchasing activities . . . will hinder
undesirable covert purchasing activities. Attempts by sound and highly regarded
persons or corporations to dislodge incompetent but entrenched management also
may be hindered in limited situations, but this seems a small price to pay for protec-
tion against undesirable covert purchasing operations.
Hearings at 49 (emphasis added).
' Through one of its subsidiaries, Bath was in prime contention for a large Navy contract, the
award of which would greatly increase earnings, require a large amount of capital outlay, and
greatly affect the economy surrounding the location of the subsidiary. See note 53 infra.
4" The others named as defendants represented a broad and diverse portion of the financial
community. Defendant Merkle was president of defendant corporation Madison Fund, Inc., a
closed-end investment company, and associated with defendant MAD International, Inc., a foreign
investment company. Defendant McConnell was vice-president of defendant Donner Corporation,
which acted as an investing agent and nominee for a Donner family. Defendant Hambro American
Bank & Trust Co. was owned by a holding company which was owned partially by Hambros
Bank, Ltd. (also apparently a defendant, thought not named) and partially by a small group of
individual stockholders, including Blot, who was also a director of Hambros Bank, Ltd. Defendant
Penturn was an individual stockholder of Bath. Defendant Clark Estates, Inc., provided investment
advice and related services for a Clark family. Also included, although not named as a defendant,
was Daly & Co., which was composed of individuals who were associated with Hambro American
Bank & Trust Co. Daly & Co. was a nominee partnership for Hambros Bank, Ltd., which kept
its own and its subsidiaries' accounts at Hambro American Bank & Trust Co. through which the
transactions in Bath securities were made.
47305 F. Supp. at 531.
48 The intended date for the meeting was one day prior to the scheduled announcement by the
Navy of the winner of the contract. See note 53 infra.
Bath's chief executive officer and other board members had been told
by Blot and some of the other defendants of the "group's" intentions.
These defendants said that parties to their agreement had recently pur-
chased substantial amounts of Bath's securities and that they were prepared
to exercise their warrants and convert their preferred stock to common if
necessary.49 The defendants indicated they held far in excess of ten per
cent.50
Bath is the first reported decision involving section 13 (d) interpreting
what is or is not a "group" within the definition of "person" in section
13 (d) (3). Interestingly, the court concluded that all of the named de-
fendants, and some who were not named, including those shareholders
whose names were listed on a sheet of paper, were a "group" within the
meaning of section 13 (d). This conclusion was reached without discus-
sion." Apparently, the court merely applied section 13 (d) (3) to its find-
ings without discerning any necessity for explanation.
This conclusion would appear to be far-reaching, yet compelled by the
language of section 13 (d). The defendants were composed of a diverse
group. For reasons not discussed in the decision, they wanted to replace the
leadership of the corporation in which they all had varying amounts of
equity interest. By any other name, their "deliberate, conscious plan" was
nothing more than a shareholders' voting agreement to pool their voting
interests to attempt to bring about a change in the corporate management."
However, because of the language of section 13 (d), the court's conclusion
seems inevitable. The defendants had, however loosely, formed a "group
for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing" of Bath securities. Thus
they were "deemed a 'person' for the purposes" of section 13 (d)."
Significantly, the factual background in Bath does not fit that for which
the Williams Act supposedly was framed. First, there was no tender offer.
The only common factor of this "plan" and a tender offer is the apparent
attempt by the defendants to reach their objectives by obtaining control of
Bath. The decision gives no indication as to how these defendants acquired
" Each share of preferred stock had one vote but could be converted to common stock in the
ratio of 2.43 shares of common for each share of preferred. Each warrant granted the holder the
right to purchase one share of common at the price stated on the warrant. Of most importance,
the decision does not reveal how the defendants obtained the Bath securities that they beneficially
owned.
"oAssuming full conversion, the defendants indicated that they held some 930,000 out of a
total of some 1.9 million shares, which they believed to be outstanding. Subsequent to the begin-
ning of the suit, Blot and two other defendants filed a motion that no injunction issue because
they had sent statements to the SEC purporting to fulfill the requirements of § 13 (d). However,
pending determination of the legal sufficiency of the statements, the defendants were enjoined from
proceeding with their plan until compliance with § 13 (d) was made.
aiThe legal discussion by the court regarding application of section 13 (d) is limited to estab-
lishing that the defendants were beneficial owners. The court defines beneficial ownership of stock
to include "the right to determine how the stock was voted," as well as power over the purchase
or sale of the stock. 305 F. Supp. at 537 (emphasis added).
"aSee H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 200 (1961).
53 In fact, at least three of the defendants virtually admitted as much by attempting to file
statements after the suit began. See note 50 supra. Of subsidiary importance, but apparently un-
derlying the decision, was the court's desire to maintain corporate stability in the face of the threat
of the concurrence of the defendants' call for a special stockholders' meeting on one day and the
scheduled announcement by the Navy of the contract award on the next. The court felt that if
the meeting were called "it is very likely that [Bath's] chances of obtaining a part of the . .
Contract will be severely limited." 305 F. Supp. at 538.
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"directly or indirectly" the securities they controlled." Importantly, the
court's discussion of the reasons prompting the passage of the Williams Act
includes nothing that alludes to tender offers. Second, these defendants
were not corporate raiders. They were not even "outsiders," as that term is
normally used in tender offer situations. Their main purpose was to cause
a change in management. There is no indication in the decision that protec-
tion of other shareholders was needed. There was no indication that other
shareholders were even involved.
It is important to consider whether the disclosure requirements of section
13 (d) were relevant to the situation in Bath. All of the material informa-
tion required in section 13 (d) had been voluntarily given to the corpora-
tion. It is possible that not all of the identities of the parties involved had
been communicated, but a significant number had been, and the central
figure in the "plan" was a director of the issuer. Assuming that little or no
information was communicated concerning the source of funds used by
the defendants in making their acquisitions, it is difficult to see of what
relevance such information would have been to Bath. No other stockholder
was being asked to tender his shares, and consequently no knowledge of
whether the defendants could pay for them would have been needed. The
purpose of the defendants' plan, the number of shares owned or to which
the defendants had a right to acquire, and information concerning "any
contracts, arrangements, or understandings" of the defendants with any
other person concerning Bath securities had been explicitly conveyed to
Bath.
Finally, there is nothing in the decision to indicate the efficiency or
inefficiency of the incumbent management of Bath, especially with respect
to the "object" of the defendants' activities. This voting agreement of the
defendants represented a direct threat to corporate management. It was a
thrust at control of the corporate structure. In this sense, it can be
likened to a tender offer. Possibly, the management of Bath was protecting
the interests of its "shareholders in connection with its supervision over
the affairs of the company."'" However, it can be more easily seen as an act
of self-preservation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The scope of the court's conclusion of what persons constitute a "group"
and the application of section 13 (d) in Bath appear to go far beyond the
supposed intent of the framers of the Williams Act. The broad application
of the term "group" by the court to what was otherwise a shareholders'
agreement would appear to sweep within its grasp every type of share-
holders' voting agreement that even remotely affects the controlling interest
of a corporation. All that would appear to be required is a cumulative in-
terest that exceeds ten per cent." If such an agreement does exceed that
"See note 49 supra.
55 305 F. Supp. at 538.
" The present Commissioner of the SEC wants the percentage lowered to 57. Hearings on
Problems in the Securities Industry Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1969).
[Vol. 24
